5 Developing the Metro with Welsh Government 2014-2016

Back to: 4 Developing a Cardiff Capital Region Metro Vision 2010-2013

Next page: 6 Buying and building a Metro 2016-2024

In November 2013, like a fish out of water, on a part time fixed term contract, I joined Welsh Government to further develop “the Metro”.  This next two years were perhaps the most challenging time on my Metro journey, but which ultimately led in 2015 to the project being formally approved.

In this chapter I cover:

5.1 Landing in Welsh Government and Cathays Park

I am not sure how well Welsh Government (WG) officials were disposed to my arrival late in 2013 as an employee, on a fixed term part time temporary contract, in Minister Edwina Hart’s Economy Science and Transport (EST) department.  My unofficial title was “Metro Development Director and Advisor”; this was not an official Civil Service Director role (which at that time I was completely unfamiliar with) or even a formal ministerial advisory role.  I guess the title helped give the project a little more focus and me a little more leverage and influence, both inside and outside the civil service.  Some more cynical folk suggested I was being asked to help work on Metro within the civil service to “shut me up”.

Going into bureaucracy of government was also an eye opener to me. For example, whilst there was a degree of media and industry chatter about the Metro (that I had perhaps initiated), there was very little discussion of Metro actually within the Welsh Government civil service, or the UK Governments Department for Transport (DfT) for that matter.  Remember it was the DfT who in reality were the responsible party given rail was and still is, not a devolved matter.  In fact, I had also reached out earlier in my efforts to some key figures at the DfT and the general response I generally received to the Metro idea was, “this is a very interesting idea”, which is code for please carry on but that will never happen. 

So, I was pretty clear I had a challenge on my hands. 

5.2 Building a team and taking advice

Bayo Dosunmu, an actual Deputy Director who had not long been in post, was as helpful as he could to support my initial efforts (despite I suspect, his reservation as to my role, its profile and my interpretation of the scope of my work.). It’s a tough gig being a senior civil servant as I am sure people like James Price, Simon Jones and Peter McDonald can attest. Nonetheless, the arrival of a new Transport Minister had also resulted in some senior leadership changes which did make a space for me.   

Another who helped my orientation and already on the inside (again part time) was Simon Lander, who was an experienced part time project management consultant. He would later lead the very rapid implementation of Pye Corner station on the Ebbw Valley line.  He was a breath of fresh air and helped procure some of the study work we needed.  It was Bayo and Simon who also helped me bring in (like me on a part time basis) Luke Albanese (who Jon Fox had introduced me to) and later Andrew Jones both of Mott Macdonald who were both an enormous source of insight and help to me over the period 2013-2016 given their experience on LR and urban transport systems development.   

Early in my time at Welsh Government, in December 2013 as I recall, I presented, along with Luke, on Metro and the opportunities and challenges it presented, to the majority of WG’s Transport team at Cathays Park[1]. They all seemed energised and keen to engage.

I have also included in the appendices a December 2013 briefing note prepared by Luke, which I think has some merit today, and which provided a substantive foundation for much of the work of the next two years (See Appendices Luke Albanese briefing note to WG Metro team December 2013). 

Luke also introduced me to John Baggs, who is a name of note in the UK Light Rail industry. John worked for the Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) from 1969 to 1988. He was a senior planning officer who played a key role in making the Newcastle Metro become a reality before going on to become its general manager. Disappointingly, I felt his contributions were rather undervalued by some WG colleagues.  This core team also included Simon Nichols from Newport council.  Simon had worked with SEWTA and a number of the region’s local authorities and helped shape our initial thinking around bus networks and services.

It is also a little disappointing to note that Andrew Jones (who was pivotal in the 2015-2018 period with TfW) only joined me as a replacement later in 2014 for Luke Albanese (who in 2023 became Director of Mass Transit for the West Yorkshire Combined Authority). Luke’s knowledge, expertise and forthright views were not always appreciated by officials. 

This is also one of the issues and problem with the Civil Service (and perhaps more so in Wales where wider political influence may be brought to bear); while I seek out those with more knowledge and expertise than me, perhaps the bureaucracy of Welsh government is generally much more comfortable with those who are perhaps a little more biddable.  Luke was and still is, an expert in his field and offered views that were not always well received.  How I survived in this space for so long is a mystery to me.

It seemed to me that WG officials like Dave Thomas, James Ardern, Alison Thomas, Dafydd Munro, Nathan Barnhouse, Mal Drury Rose, Gareth Morgan, Claire Bennet, Rhodri Griffiths (too many to mention) were actually really engaged by the prospect of a Metro (but not blind to the challenges). It seemed the actual prospect of a major Metro programme made their job more interesting.

I also retained and grew my network in the wider rail industry and started an ongoing dialogue with NR’s Sheffield Tram-train team with Simon Coulthard and Ian Ambrose.  Closer to home I continued my regular and informal catch ups with Mark Langman (NR Route Director in Wales) and Mike Bagshaw & Ian Bullock (Arriva Train Wales) to share ideas and get insight on how the rail industry actually functioned.  I also had a very insightful informal meeting with an ex-CEO of NR, Sir John Armitt; his recounting of the challenges of effecting change in NR and perhaps its subconscious resistance to change and innovation were very instructive.  Another of John’s recollections was also insightful and noted whilst Chair of the Olympic Delivery Authority that the fixed end date really focused minds and improved decision making.  Whereas in most projects timelines are often extended, it was in this case only cost and scope that could be shifted.

I always consider the rail privatisation of the 1990s led to not just to a functional split (so rail infrastructure and train operations) but a cultural split. The more customer facing, and perhaps innovative parts ended up in the Train Operating Companies (ToC) and the parts most comfortable with process and procedure in Railtrack and later Network Rail (NR). The fact the behemoth project management process “GRIP” came out of NR was no surprise.  I often characterise NR as the Morlocks and the ToCs as the Eloi – those who have read HG Wells will appreciate the reference. 

Whilst many, even most, in NR were supportive and helpful I recall another conversation with an NR official, that as best as I can remember went along the lines, “If you pursue this LR plan, then NR can make things very difficult for you, and you will have to buy the asset from NR”. 

Some people in NR, in my view, then and now, tend to view the rail network as their “train set” and not as a strategic public asset that they are custodians of, and accountable to government in discharging that responsibility.  As I explain later (See The Rail Industry, Wales and HS2) the idea that WG should have to pay for the Core Valley Lines (CVL) is in my view preposterous as it is already a publicly owned asset – in Wales.

I also presented at the annual Light Rail Transit (LRT) conference a few times to spread the news of the emerging Metro project in Cardiff. I am not sure WG officials were entirely comfortable with me talking so publicly about some aspects of a potential Metro – which still had no formal status at that stage. So much so, in 2014 I think, they asked what I was going to say at the event, I replied, “pretty much the same as last year”.  “You spoke at least year’s event?” was the surprised response.  I also met a James Harkins of “Light Rail UK” at one the LRT events and followed up with multiple presentations over the following years to the LR All Pary Parliamentary Group (APPG) at Westminster to further spread the word.

I think it was at an LRT event I first met Peter Cushing, then MD of Metrolink, who was a regular and very supportive host to many trips up to Manchester with officials from south Wales (WG and the nascent Cardiff Capital Region). He later worked with me as part of the MTR bid to build and operate the Metro in 2016/17 (still the best solution for the Metro in my view). Similarly, people like Nick Thompson and Nick Evans at Bircham Dyson Bell (via an intro from Luke) provided invaluable expertise and advice re Light Rail, planning, Transport Work Acts (TWA), etc.  I also retained contact with those in the ToC world who could see the Metro opportunity – I still have a few emails from Claire Falkiner (at the time at Arriva Trains Wales) who was never short of ideas.

I also have to acknowledge the contribution of Geoff Inskip, who had recently retired as CEO of the West Midlands PTE (he also initiated Metrolink in Manchester in an earlier life) and note his bus reform measures in the West Midlands which I felt could provide a lesson for us in southeast Wales.  I first met Geoff at a HS2 event in Birmingham in about 2012 and spoke alongside him and Julie Mills of Greengauge to explain the HS2 issues as regards Wales.  Geoff was a source of insight and support, and I later asked him to talk to the Capital Region Board in 2014 to share his experience of regional transport systems development. Later he actually did some consultancy work for a nascent TfW looking to help the rail /bus integration agenda. Just before I left WG/TfW I joined Geoff and introduced him to the MDs of the main bus operators in southeast Wales and those officers in local authorities with responsibility for bus.  In a parallel universe Geoff could have been CEO for a newly established TfW, but again I think he was, like Luke Albanese, perhaps “not the right shape” for Welsh Government.  Geoff’s role was time limited and the progress he made on the “bus agenda” stalled after he left, whilst focus for TfW moved to the procurement of the Wales and Borders franchise.

Early in my time at Welsh Government, at the end of 2013, I also went on an intensive two-day fact finding visiting to Stuttgart region.   Our host, Tomas Kiwitt, who was Head of Planning at Verband Region Stuttgart, assembled a range of local officials and experts in respect of transport, planning, regional economic development, etc.  Most instructive was the insight that they devoted the overwhelming proportion of regional resources to invest in expansion and operation of their public transport network – especially the “S-Bahn”.  There were and still are, many parallels between the Cardiff Capital Region and the Stuttgart region and much we can still learn re: regional development and infrastructure investment. The memories of the late might visit to a Stuttgart beer cellar and the teaching of German beer drinking songs, by the then, new Cardiff University VC Colin Riordon, as well as the humorous anecdotes and storytelling of David Llewelyn will stay with me forever.

Just before I joined WG, I also took a trip to Nottingham with James Brown to look at their tram system and to meet the Head of their Transport Team, Andrew Gregory, who would later join Cardiff Council and accompany us on that Stuttgart trip.

I also continued to meet and talk to those in the region who were supportive of the Metro concept and had ideas to contribute.  At one such meeting at the Pontypridd Town Council office on Berw road, it was the then Mayor of Pontypridd, Jayne Brencher (TfW’s Director of Comms, Lewis Bencher’s mother) who first suggested to me, the case to introduce another station in Pontypridd just behind the bus station.  What a good idea, and something we really need to embrace today re: integration, a bus station next to a railway station.  Similarly, I had more than one meeting with those campaigning for a station on the SWML at Magor.

These engagement activities also included building and/or strengthening relations with key local stakeholders.  This included business groups like IOD (Robert Lloyd Griffiths), CBI Wales (Ian Price & Leighton Jenkins) and FE/HE colleges.  I had quite a number of meetings with Coleg y Cymoedd and the then principal Judith Evans and some of her team, like Gavin Davies from the Engineering school, to cover opportunities like a rail/electrification training facility at Nantgarw in support of Metro. I had similar discussion with Julie Lydon of the University of South Wales, Mike James of Cardiff and Vale College, and Simon Pirotte of Bridgend College.

As you can see, I constantly sought expertise and advice from those who had “done it”, had local knowledge and those who could support its wider implementations,  and especially visiting and learning from places with similar transport and economic profiles, etc like Manchester, Nottingham and Stuttgart. I was also still busy continuing to build the Metro story with my wider stakeholder group that I had retained since 2011/12. 

5.3 Working with the emerging Cardiff Capital Region

Over the period from 2013-2016  I was an observer on Edwina Hart’s Cardiff Capital/City Region Board[2] chaired by Roger Lewis, CEO of the WRU Figure 58 Figure 59.  This was a natural follow on to Elizabeth Haywood’s report to the Minister on City Regions.  The Metro was a key component of its remit vis a vis connectivity and its relationship to the economy of southeast East Wales.   This group of business leaders, academics, and local politicians (this included my colleague Kevin Morgan, Colin Riordan, Russell Goodway, Peter Fox,  Brendon Toomey, and business figures like Dan Langford and Philip Jardine amongst and of course David Stevens  who had been there since 2010),  were very  much supportive of my efforts and would grow to share my frustration with the apparent inertia of the civil service in actually making it happen. 

Figure 58 First “Cardiff City Region” Board meeting December 2013

Figure 59 Agenda for first Cardiff City Region Board meeting 19 December 2013

This group was also by design a little divisive as not all the region’s local authorities were engaged. Moreover, whilst some Local Authority leaders were invited, Cardiff Council’s leader, Phil Baile, was not, with Cardiff being represented by Russell Goodway the Cabinet Member responsible for economic development. Nor did it as I recall, include Andrew Morgan, then Transport lead for RCT and who was about to become leader of RCT council.  

The tensions within the Labour Party were clear and flowed into the nascent City Deal arrangements[3], which did engage all the region’s local authorities, and which would finally be agreed in early 2016. Tension was also amplified by the Minister’s decision to end support for SEWTA, which eventually ceased to operate in 2014. Others won’t agree and may tell a different story, but I think this was necessary to make the space, in 2015, for the creation of Transport for Wales. SEWTA as it was set up was not the right organisation to take forward the Metro (See 1.6 Others could see some of what was needed).

Nonetheless, my informal membership of the City Region Board during 2014 and 2015 allowed me to continue to evangelise the Metro (with Ministerial support) and share my frustrations with its members, of the constraints of the civil service bureaucracy in making it happen. A key activity was to continue my engagement with the leaders and CEOs of the local authorities in SE Wales. I have probably presented to officers and members in nearly all authorities at some point; most regular interactions were with Merthyr, Cardiff, Newport, Bridgend, RCT and Monmouthshire. I have to note the supportive efforts of senior officers and politicians like Sheila Davies, Paul Matthews, Richard Crook, Will Godfrey, Bob Bright, Darren Mepham, Huw David, Brendan Toomey and many others which helped keep the Metro concept at the forefront of official and political thinking across the region.

I also worked closely with the Cardiff City Region Unit[4] at Cardiff University, who supported Edwina Hart’s Cardiff City Region Board. They helped me procure the various logos for Metro and CCR, some of which are still in use today. I was and still am especially impressed by the three Chevrons logo for the Cardiff City Region which Smorgasbord did a great job in developing. Those three chevrons appear on nearly all the insignia for the local authorities in the region as well as the old Glamorgan Authority. I am not sure who had the idea, but just tipping the chevrons on their side also provided a perfect Metro logo Figure 60.

Figure 60 Metro logo originally prepared for the Cardiff City Region Board by WG

I had managed to include this brand development work in the scope of the budget secured in 2014 for Metro Development; that scope also included funding to begin development of the new southeast Wales regional transport model which was one of the recommendations of the 2013 Metro Impact Study.  The role of Helen Bowkett deserves a mention here as she helped establish the first transport model that would be an essential foundation for all the more detailed appraisal that was to follow all the way through procurement to the present day and the work of Paul Chase and his Geospatial Transport Analysis Team (GSTAT) at Transport for Wales.

Another parallel activity, in a non WG capacity, was my role on the Newport Task force. It was during this time, we first explored options for taking tram-train from a potential future Caerphilly/Machen/Newport service from the Ebbw Line along Cardiff Road into the city centre – so avoiding the congested South Wales Mainline (SWML).  This was set out again in Metro and Me in 2018 and something we ought to revisit at some point.

5.4 Initial Metro development and frustrations

With the support of Luke Albanese, during 2014 I led further scheme development to explore: enhancement to the SWML Relief Line corridor, value for money and demand assessment of a CVL upgrade (including application of Light Rail, frequency enhancements, as well as further ongoing appraisal of extensions and new stations); we also sought legal advice re network designation.  Some of the Relief Line work flowed from earlier SEWTA work and my 2013 Metro Impact Study and formed the basis of the later Lord Burns Southeast Wales Transport Commission (SEWTC) work and its final recommendations. We also engaged David Ward (later of Tirion Homes) and his Arup team to begin to assess some of the development opportunities around a potential Metro network. Lyndon Thomas within WG ably supported, but there really wasn’t the institutional capacity to develop these nascent TOD opportunities.

In summer 2014, most of that work was included and presented in a draft “Metro Strategic Implementation Plan”.  This was my first task after coming to WG and was based on the assumption that some form of traditional Heavy Rail (HR) Valley Lines Electrification (VLE) would happen (which was not our preferred option, and which was already beginning to unravel at about the same time). In undertaking that work, I engaged a very wide range of people and organisations Figure 61 and based the findings and recommendations on both the work we commissioned and the advice of our broader stakeholder group.

However, for a myriad of reasons, it was never published; it’s probably worth a read. As part of sharing the findings of this work within WG, a meeting with senior civil servants was set up – again it seemed to me to they wanted to try and put the Metro genie back in the bottle and so tried to unpick the emerging findings and the role of Luke Albanese.  Jeff Collins and WG officials (who again I worked with on the earlier VLE business case) really got stuck into the costs and challenges of on street LR systems.

After that report was “shelved”, later in 2014 Welsh Government published a very much more circumspect “Metro Update Report[5]”.  Moves were also afoot to try and move me on as well – although I suspect I was a different proposition to Luke.

Figure 61 People & organisations involved in preparation of 2014 Metro SIP (never published)

It was these developments by mid-2014 that forced me to up my game. I needed to if we were to have anything like a Metro, as it seemed to me that some senior civil servants were concerned that I was setting expectations “too high” with the city region board group.  I recall James Price joining a City Region Board meeting to try and dampen down aspirations for the Metro; Russell Goodway noted the rarity of such “Sir Humphrey” like interventions to the Board.

It was in 2014 and through into 2016, James Price had also set up another Metro Advisory Group including people like Andrew Haines (then Chair of the CAA and later to become CEO of NR), Chris Gibb and David Stevens.  I suspect this was to provide a counterbalance to my more “radical” proposals.  I wasn’t a member of this group and only engaged briefly – often to disagree with its output.  I suspect this group was also a fundamental part of the Metro development machine emerging in Welsh Government. As is so often the case, it seems to me that the formal Auditor General for Wales 2016 review[6] of  “Welsh Government investment in rail services and infrastructure” really didn’t understand how the machinery of the WG civil service actually worked or what was actually going on at the time (and didn’t it seems, have any knowledge of my work).

I have to reflect that no-one is going advise ministers to commit to hundreds of millions of pounds in capital investment based on just one person’s or even one team’s convictions. You are going to need to triangulate and secure multiple sources of support – especially when one is considering major rail investment in Wales that would need UK Government support. As I set out below, this advisory board almost certainly helped James Price secure the funding deal for the “Valley Line Enhancement” (that VLE morphed into) agreed with DfT in late 2014.  However, I think the Advisory Board also, perhaps unwittingly, provided cover for some of, in my opinion, the sub-optimal decisions that would follow in the next two or three years.

5.5 What are we electrifying and who is paying? 

All this work and activity was against the backdrop of the UK Government dragging its feet over electrification of the Valley Lines.  Despite my reservations re Metro progress, I was aware that James Price and the senior Welsh Government team (including Gareth Morgan, Nathan Barnhouse, Mal Rose, Simon Tew amongst others) were pursuing discussions with UK Government throughout 2014 to try and secure funding for Valley Lines electrification. 

In fact, the whole sequence of events for the Valley Lines programme was tied up with the electrification of the Great Western Mainline (GWML) and SWML (or not.).  Some (not all) of the details and history were set out in Welsh Affairs Select Committee report published in 2017[7] and a Public Accounts Committee review[8] at the same time.

All was good in 2009 when Lord Adonis confirmed the electrification of the GWML and SWML to Swansea.  However, the incoming coalition government in 2010 paused that plan to review scope and costs. In 2011 that review concluded the electrification would go as far as Cardiff – but not Swansea.  The UK Transport Secretary, Philip Hammond, did announce[9] in March 2011 (just after my first report was published) that the DfT would work with WG on the business for electrification of the Valley Lines.  I appeared on BBC Wales Today with the late Cheryl Gillan to discuss and set out my conviction the wires would eventually reach Swansea.

Just over twelve months later, following WG’s development of a new business cases for electrification (that I actually helped prepare) the new UK Government Transport Secretary, Justine Greening announced in July 2012 the electrification of the SWML to Swansea and of the Valley Lines[10]. All seemed well.

However, in parallel with my effort re Metro in WG over the 2013-15 period, the funding for the Valley Lines and electrification to Swansea, was subject to due diligence. Increasing worries over affordability and the strength of the business case as well as it appeared, different views between WG and UK Government with regard to who was paying for what[11], caused the entire programme to unravel. This “funding dispute” and an expectation from UK Government that Welsh Government contribute a significant proportion of the costs (which due diligence were now exposing as unaffordable) rumbled on from 2013 and into 2014.

As an aside to Great Western Electrification Programme (GWEP) it’s also worth mentioning an informal discussion I had, probably back in 2012 or 2013, with a Paul Fishwick of the DfT.  As I recall he was project sponsor for the GWEP, and we discussed how much unused space there was on the rail approach to Cardiff Central from the East (esp. through Splott where there used to be a six-track railway).  So much room in fact, one could easily envisage a double tack LR alignment, and some stations being developed as part of Metro (and independent of NR operations).  This is something I considered in my earlier musing re: a Cardiff Crossrail and presented in my article with Vaughan Gething at about the same time.  However, as is typical of UK Government led projects in Wales, the value engineering that was eventually needed in 2015/16/17 resulted in the replacement bridges at Splott Rd and Windsor Rd being reduced in width. This pretty much stymied any prospect of using that space for additional rail alignments and new stations, etc.  More bizarrely, after an earlier call from NR probably in 2014/15, they did keep the additional span for the freight line under Windsor rd. bridge as an option for future Metro routes.  Now that freight line has closed; however, the later value engineering of the bridges means there is no realistic prospect of it ever being used for rail again. This for me is another metaphor for UK Government/DfT poor stewardship of Wales’s rail network.

It was in December 2014, that Minister Edwina Hart, James Price and his team finally brokered a deal with UK Government to progress an electrification and an enhancement programme for the Valley Lines[12]; the role of Stephen Crabb, as recently appointed Secretary of State for Wales, also helped. That announcement also seemed to confirm UK Government’s commitment to electrify to Swansea at the same time. The deal though required a major funding commitment from Welsh Government with the DfT agreeing to contribute £125M toward the Valley Lines project that had to be worth at least £300M. It also appeared that the DfT would contribute £105M toward SWML electrification.  Remember this was, and still is, a non-devolved area where one might have expected the DfT to cover the full costs (or at least the majority of costs) of the electrification programme.  This “deal” also predated the City Deal that was eventually wrapped around it, and the contribution from the European Union via ERDF.

As part of that arrangement, powers to procure the next Wales & Borders (W&B) franchise in 2016 were also “shared“ with WG via an agency agreement – a decision which was also fundamental to the Metro journey.  Note that when UK Government ran the rail services procurement in 1996, they stymied a Light Rail proposal for the Valley Lines and followed up in 2003 with a “no-growth” contract for the new Wales and Borders franchise.  Further evidence of the poverty of the London based decision-making machine in respect of Wales’ economic infrastructure. This is a longstanding issue.

Despite progress on the Valley Lines via the franchise procurement, electrification to Swansea never really moved and the then Transport Secretary, Chris Grayling, eventually killed the prospect of electrification to Swansea in 2017[13].  In mid-2020 new bi-mode IET trains started operating on the GWML/SWML; under wires to Cardiff[14] and diesel from there to Swansea.  This is unfinished business.

5.6 Can the Civil Service really deliver a Metro?

So, back in early 2015, I was pleased that the civil service team under James Price and the Minister had secured a commitment from the DfT for a “Valley Lines Enhancement” programme. This did provide space for a more comprehensive upgrade for the Valley Lines beyond just a 25Kv HR electrification; James Price even asked that the team properly appraise all options and Andrew Jones (who had by now replaced Luke) led an appraisal process to help us refine the Metro Vision and set out some real options to support the anticipated procurement in 2016/17.

However, I was still concerned that any such project would eventually become just be a small increment from the status quo. I was convinced we needed a step change and something that reflected the work I had been leading at Welsh Government since the end of 2013.

It is also worth me acknowledging that over the period 2013-2015 when I was working part time with WG on the Metro, my naivety was often exposed. It was clear that the senior officials, and I include James Price and other colleagues like Jeff Collins, Gareth Morgan, Andy Falleyn, Nathan Barnhouse, Mal Drury Rose, Rhodri Griffiths, Claire Bennet, Robin Beckman and others, were caught between wanting to do something ambitious vs the reality of their obligation to the civil service code and what advice they gave ministers. The latter means you can’t really advise Minsters to do something over which they have no powers, and lack the funding, institutional capacity and capability to deliver.   Remember Wales did not (and still does not in 2024) have powers over rail infrastructure. In 2014 it had very limited capacity and capability in rail scheme development, and was, unconsciously, much more disposed toward road building and lacked it seemed to me the kind of capital funding required for a Metro. One can’t ignore either the influence of the trade unions on the emerging Metro concept, good and bad, but more on that later.

This challenging situation was best expressed in something a senior civil servant told me,

 “Mark what you fail to understand, is that our job is sometimes to do the wrong thing, in the best way we can”   

My reply was along the lines “how do you motivate yourself to get out of bed in the morning to prepare to do the wrong thing”.

In that vein, I recall another interaction with a senior official just after we had met the Minister which went something like,

“Mark, what the Minister meant was….”. 

Something that clearly did not reflect my understanding of the earlier discussion. I also recall early in 2015 being corralled into a meeting at Ty Hywel with James Price and some of his senior team, to meet Chris Gibb[15] (who had also kindly given up his time to meet me on previous occasions).  It seemed to me that Chris had been primed to try and descale my ambitions for Metro; as I recall, I effectively rebutted every issue raised at that session and left even more vindicated in my ambition for the Metro.

I found all this hugely frustrating as over 18 months I had led/commissioned really robust “Metro” work from likes of Motts (and Luke Albanese and later Andrew Jones were a fantastic help to me), CH2M Hill, Arup,  BDB, etc that helped build even more evidence and data beyond the 2013 Metro Impact Study and led to the preparation of the unpublished Metro Strategic Implementation Plan by the middle of 2014. 

5.7 Some technical insight re Light Rail and working assumptions

It may help to share some technical notes of my working assumptions in December 2014

  • Light Rail (LR) systems typically operate on railways that have been de-designated as “non-mainline” or in street environments as “tramways”.  To convert traditional mainline to “non-mainline” requires a lengthy railway closure process and a Transport Work Act Order (TWAO) to enable an asset transfer.  This was the approach adopted by systems in Manchester, Newcastle, Croydon and Nottingham; even the London Underground is defined as “non-mainline” though it is very much more HR in character  
  • Whilst all Network Rail (NR) track and operations thereof is defined as “mainline” and heavily regulated through statute by the regulator, the Office for Road and Rail (ORR); non mainline systems can be owned and operated in a very different regulatory and process ecosystem and one less constrained by the ORR and the Rail Acts of 2005 and 1993.  This was also an important consideration for me, to get away from the Network Rail / Train Operating Company (ToC) world and the Heavy Rail thinking and processes associated with it
  • It is also worth stating that LR does not always mean street running. In fact, in most cases the latter is operationally undesirable and can increase reliability and performance risks if you have to mix LR traffic with pedestrians and traffic.  The best LR systems maximise the segregation of operation from other “stuff”.  This philosophy has flowed through into the current work on the Metro – especially the bay line and the emerging Cardiff Crossrail project
  • Whilst “street running” is a useful capability of LR, it  is much more the ability of Light Rail Vehicles (LRVs) to handle steeper gradients and tighter curves that present more route and alignment option than is possible with HR – and with lower capital costs
  • LR systems typically use Line of Site (LoS) operation and Tram Control systems (TCS). Although they don’t have to; Manchester Metrolink initially retained its block system on the old NR kit and Tyne and Wear Metro (which is at the Heavier end of LR) uses a block signalling system.  The primary reason LR does not need blocks is that an LRV can stop very quickly using track brakes given lower weight and a top operating speed of 80~100kph.  HR trains need far longer to stop and so block signalling is required from a safety perspective. More localised LoS LR networks typically have more capacity and operational flexibility than traditional HR block signalling systems
  • It is also true that nearly all LR systems operate with Driver Only Operation (DOO) and don’t have “guards”. Instead, they typically have “roving customer service staff”. This was then and still is, a more efficient and less operationally constrained use of staff leading to lower unit costs (an important consideration – especially for a network intended to be extended in future). This though is something not so often seen on HR systems outside core urban routes. More generally, LR systems also operate with different staff Terms and Conditions (T&Cs), and it is no secret that a tram driver typically earns less than a train driver
  • Even more important was the potential to move away from “Network Rail” and Train Operating Company (TOC) heavy rail processes and mainline standards set out in ORRs “ROGs”[16].  This would enable a “de-designated” LR network to apply different standards and procedures, T&Cs and offer the potential of far lower opex/VKm than HR; to note Manchester Metrolink before Covid operated with no subsidy
  • It is also typically the case, that any asset transfer of rail from NR to another public body would be at a nominal value.  I believe that such transfers related to track for Tyne and Wear Metro and the Manchester Metrolink were for £1 – albeit the liabilities were passed over as well.  These are publicly owned assets after all.  The over bureaucratic and undefendable valuation placed on the Core Valley Lines as part of its transfer from NR to WG, was frankly unacceptable and unnecessary (See The Rail Industry, Wales and HS2).

5.8 A developing Metro vision and growing frustrations

By the end of 2014, the Valley Lines 25Kv electrification project (VLE) as set out in 2012, was dead in the water, and a new funding deal with DfT re: the upgrade of the entire Valley Lines was established. It was also clear, to at least some of us, that some form of “de-designated “non-mainline” Light Rail (LR) system, operating using a Tram Control System (TCS) (with blocks for single track sections at the HoV), on a non-NR asset was going to be the best option for at least some of the Core Valley Lines – even if phased. 

One of the reasons/assumptions driving this thinking at that time, was the fact that Queen St north junction was a bottleneck in Heavy Rail (HR) terms and that Network Rail (NR) had informed us that the Cardiff Area Signalling and Renewal Project (CASR), would only reliably enable 16tph through Queen St and only retain 2tph through Cardiff West Junction to/from the City Line.  However, the original CASR scope included 4tph on the City Line Figure 62; the value engineering undertaken by DfT/NR in 2013/14 to remove that requirement is still a problem today and in effect passed an operational constraint and liability from the DfT/NR to WG/TfW and CVL operations[17]. 

Figure 62 A collection of slides going back to 211 re original requirements of CASR

My thinking then, was that any future asset transfer would not include the City Line and definitely not Cardiff West Junction. This meant that any Metro solution re “turn up and go” service frequency from the Heads of the Valleys and Coryton, would have to manage via Queen St – and we would also need 6tph from Caerphilly. It was very difficult to see how you might get 20/22 tph through Queen St north using a traditional Heavy Rail (HR) block signalling system, whereas LR systems using Line of Sight (LoS), and Tram-Control Systems can typically handle 24/25tph.

This LR approach would maximise the capacity of the existing network and allow the “turn up and go” frequency we required, with minimum capital investment. The only downside was that we’d have to leave the City Line, as well as Vale of Glamorgan (VoG) Line services, out of a Light Rail programme (at least initially) given a very more expensive and complex programme would be required to provide separation between NR track and new LR track from Cardiff Central to the City Line. During earlier work we had considered an “on street” connection that completely avoided the NR kit.

To minimise risks and costs we also explored the option of just converting the Rhymney & Coryton Lines to the bay as a potential first phase Figure 66.  This would have required a new single track bi-directional LR span over Newport Rd, a complete separation of HR and LR at Queen St and a link across Callaghan Square from the bay line so the Rhymney LR services could still reach central (similar to the current Phase 1 of Cardiff Crossrail).  This would have freed up all the new CASR capacity for services to Merthyr, Aberdare and Treherbert and allowed a later conversion to LR.  Looking back, I still think this would have been a more manageable and pragmatic initial focus.

But as it turns out technical purity comes second to institutional and constitutional pragmatism as well as trade union pressure. I suspect the later rail industry resistance to LR operations and/or de-designation, as well as opposition to DOO, may have, even subconsciously, influenced the procurement process and for me resulted in more engineering and operational risks, and higher capital and operational costs, some of which became manifest during design and delivery in 2022/3/4.

I was probably a little too constrained in my thinking at that time (as we all can be) and using assumptions that may not survive more detailed scrutiny. Looking back, my focus on LR prevented me seeing all the options and so I probably inadvertently influenced the procurement in 2016/7 (I actually contributed to the original draft Train Services Requirement in 2015) given that City Line 4tph was pretty much omitted based on my working assumption in 2015 that it would have been difficult to address in a pure segregated LR solution for the Valley Lines.  That was and still is a mistake. Had I known then that we would end up with today’s solution, I would have ensured that the City Line (as well as the Coryton Line) was included in a 4tph requirement – as well as a less “complex” service pattern.

Figure 63 Excerpts from March 2015 slide deck on Metro Options #1

Figure 64 Excerpts from March 2015 slide deck on Metro options #2

Figure 65 Excerpts from March 2015 slide deck on Metro options #3

Figure 66 Illustration of a possible Rhymney Line LR conversion (never used) May 2015

So, after about 12-18 months of pushing the agenda and leading development work with WG on part time basis, it became clear to me early in 2015, that if I relied on the normal processes of WG Civil Service governance – then the Metro I wanted was dead in the water.  This despite the PR and assertions from Ministers. 

People don’t always recognise where power lies in government, its more often spread across the bureaucracy of the administration than in the hands of ministers or even individual civil servants.  I even think Edwina Hart recognised the challenge and perhaps was not willing to “go for it”.

For me, this came to a head when, whilst at another senior civil servant meeting, I lost my temper, banged my fists on the table and said, again as best as I can recall,

 “We are the fucking Welsh Government, if we are not going to do this, no one else is.  It is easy to come up with any number of reasons why we should not do it. How about instead  we use the abundant skills and capability around  the table to actually think about how we might do something,  rather than just generate more reason why not”. 

I hope my “outburst” had an impact.

I clearly had to avoid the bureaucracy and natural inertia of the Civil Service and adopt a more Machiavellian approach to keep the Metro project moving in the right direction.

I include in the appendices a series of emails I sent to the then Minister Edwina Hart in September 2014 which exemplifies my frustration with the civil service at that time.  In fact, looking back, for me the stark choice for the Valley Lines was either properly upgrade them – or close them down.

5.9 Show me it can’t be done

It might be useful to refer to my early career, a past life running a biotech company and a lesson in dealing with obstacles and resistance to new ideas and change.

Whenever very clever engineers or biologists working for me (and people like Rob Davies, Dan Palmer, Owen Shadick and Richard Calder were part of a very impressive Q Chip team),  told me something couldn’t be done, I would listen and ask them to think about that assertion and to prepare and show me at a meeting a week or so later,  in detail, why that was the case and all the assumptions they had used in coming to that view.  In the process of unpacking the detail and testing their assumptions, they nearly always came back having found a way “to do it” (If anyone knows Rob Davies ask him to tell you all about microfluidic restrictors).  The challenge is to dissociate oneself from often emotionally held assumptions of what is and isn’t possible. 

This is a management technique I picked up whilst working at PA Consulting with BP’s Global Web hosting Leadership team back in the late 1990s early 2000s (so thanks to Len Williamson, Bruce Gourd, Eddy Quah and colleagues) and something I think should be shared more widely in the Civil Service.  In fact, in about 2018 I was asked to talk to some of the Civil Service fast track cohort on a training visit to Cardiff, about my Metro experience working in Welsh Government. My insight was that the ability of Welsh Government to make progress was in part due to the presence of an “outsider” like me, being on the inside, who was focussed more on how we might make the project happen, with less of a concern about Civil Service process and bureaucracy.

My work with BP also presented me another learning opportunity related to a human trait we are all susceptible to. As experts in one’s field, one develops an ability to assess and make decisions more quickly and so generally reducing a need to rely on your, or third parties, further time consuming and more in-depth analysis etc.  

Over time we become emotionally conditioned to be able to reach a view or make judgement more quickly than someone with little or no knowledge.   Often this is based on being intuitively aware of all the challenges and difficulties of actually progressing any intervention, etc.  This is certainly true in rail and especially when dealing with NR, safety, timetables, etc as is required.

Whilst often this is a beneficial capability, this is also where sometimes we emotionally constrain our thinking and make some ideas or the opportunity to do something different, better or more quickly to generate extra benefits, more difficult to achieve. We can sometimes default too quickly and experientially to generating a whole lot of challenges, obstacles and reasons “why not”.    For example, “There is no demand” “There is NR kit in the way”, “It won’t fit in the timetable”, “It just takes too long in the rail industry”, etc. 

We are all susceptible to this phenomenon and it can be an impediment to innovation and change.

Again, working with BP, I picked up a management technique which was about challenging senior leaders when presented with a challenge or an opportunity to focus initially on devoting their minds and emotions to “how one might” achieve something rather than the often easier, “why not” and just generating further problems and obstacles.  In doing so, one will usually find new solutions and/or approaches to deliver something, or do so more quickly, than one would ordinarily and emotionally assume was possible.

Here’s another example from my work at PA in about 2001 when I was part of BPs Global Web Hosting Leadership team responsible for the global provision of Web Hosting Services (data centres, managed services, telecoms, systems support, ops, etc). 

To very tight and commercially constrained timescale’s we had to “go live” at a new data centre in West Virginia. This was a key part of a new “best of breed” assembled web hosting service (that include telecoms, data centre management, application support, firewalls, etc), that was replacing the expensive fully managed services from IBM and many of the locally hosted web sites across the global BP business.

To do so we had to transfer hundreds of different web sites from IBM and hundreds of BP businesses across the globe.  We had to specify and procure telecoms services, servers, data storage, power supplies, systems support, etc.  Costs ran into the $10s millions. We also had to facilitate the termination of a whole range of incumbent commercial arrangements, again some of those costs were time dependant.

It was pretty clear, given lead times on some types of servers we needed (and which were on the critical path) that we would not be in a position to “know” exactly how many would be required in time to fit the overall programme.   This was a problem and a major issue, and on the surface, a reason to extend the overall programme given there was no way to speed up the server specification process. 

It seemed we had an unresolvable problem.  However, using the above approach, as best as I can recall, what we ended up doing was actually negotiating with the server supplier a “short term” returns provision which enabled us to overorder earlier on the number of servers (so we bought the max possible number we thought we might need) and so bring forward the issue of the PO.  This was done in the knowledge that we would be able to return those servers we did not ultimately need, once we had concluded the work required to more definitively define our requirement.  Whilst the unit costs for the servers were probably a little higher, this approach allowed the programme to proceed at pace and deliver on time.

This is a bit like the earlier “if you say it can’t be done, go away, think about it, and come back and show me in detail why it can’t be done.”  That process often generates a new insight and a previously unseen solution.  I learnt a lot about how you solve problems working with PA and BP.

My learning here is that that are very many clever and capable civil servants who want to do good and be ambitious…but they are often severely constrained by the way the civil service works, it thinks and is led.  It has in-built resistance and inertia…probably to protect us from despotic political leadership. It is perhaps a necessary price for democracy. I still occassionally deal with such challenges and resistance today from within both TfW and WG.

5.10 What does the First Minister think?

By early 2015, despite the funding deal re “Valley Lines upgrade” with the DfT brokered, at the end of 2014, it was becoming more and more clear to me, that if the ambitious Metro as I saw it, had a future, I needed to see the First Minister (FM), Carwyn Jones, directly one to one, to explain what was and wasn’t happening.  I didn’t really know Carwyn Jones at that time, so I give thanks to Jo Kiernan for initially briefing the FM.  It was fortuitous that I had recently met Jo at a rugby game at the Millenium Stadium, where I shared some of my frustration of working with the Welsh Government.  Jo was fundamental in setting up a private meeting between the FM and I in March 2015 (of which James Price, Jeff Colins and Minister Edwina Hart I suspect, were initially unaware). At that first 30-minute meeting with the FM, which was very cordial, I shared a few simple slides and advised the FM there were three options for the Metro:

  1. You tell people it’s too hard, we don’t have the powers, funding and capability and so we are not going to do it
  2. You do something the civil servants would probably be comfortable endorsing given the funding deal and capability of WG; so, some electrification (which as I explain later was unaffordable in traditional 25Kv OLE terms) a few more cascaded trains, maybe an extra station, but no real fundamental change, no increased frequency, little new capacity, etc and then paint this up and launch it as Metro
  3. Or we get our collective heads around the table and work out how we might actually do something transformative and worthy of the title “Metro”; and that there were phasing options (including starting LR on the Rhymney Line and retaining diesel ops on the TAM lines, at least for a period).

The FM chose option #3 and a couple of weeks later at Cathays Park, invited me to a first formal Senior Metro Meeting with him, Edwina Hart, James Price, Andrew Jeffreys, Des Clifford and Jo Kieran (and others who played in/out).    

At that first formal meeting, I was formally introduced to the FM (I had to pretend that I hadn’t previously met him), who then took formal control and responsibility for the project. I suspect Edwina probably welcomed this intervention.

James Price also pointed out to the FM the very clear risks and challenges of the ambitious approach, but to his credit the FM said that these were his risks and challenges, not James’s.  In essence the FM said “Go”.  This was going to happen.  Carwyn Jones’s intervention to take direct ownership of the project was, in my opinion, fundamental to the success of the Metro.

Whilst not the ideal approach, it was the upcoming re-franchising of Wales and Borders rail services that would actually provide the vehicle and institutional means for James Price and his senior team to find a way of making the Metro happen. 

Over the next few months my thinking and that of senior civil servants and Ministers started to align.

5.11 Building in safeguards

Despite the support and leadership of the First Minister, I was still not 100% comfortable, so I wanted some safeguards.  For me, as I described earlier, I felt that European Regional Development Funding (ERDF) via the Welsh European Funding Office (WEFO) and a City Deal could help.  So, in parallel and being Machiavellian, I was trying to get WEFO and the WG Finance team in the mix. They were both very disposed toward the Metro concept; the former became an essential component of funding required to deliver the project. I had actually been talking to the WEFO team with regard to possible Metro funding since early 2014 Figure 67. 

Figure 67 Draft notes of my initial meeting re ERDF funding for Metro in 2014

So, probably with most of transport team unaware (apart from Dafydd Munro perhaps?) I actually set out and agreed initial targets for ERDF funding for any Metro project on the Core Valley Lines. These targets were linked to more capacity, higher frequency services, shorter journeys and services to both Cardiff Central and Cardiff Bay as I knew these would lead to a much more ambitious approach, and I thought a Light Rail solution.  

These targets would also flow into the initial Train Service Requirement (TSR) that underpinned the upcoming procurement. In fact, my influence at that time resulted in an overcomplicated TSR; including the requirement for direct services from all the Heads of the Valleys (HoV)  to both Cardiff Central and the Bay that I hoped would help secure the procurement of a LR system using Line of Sight (LoS) principles.  I never expected at that time that the TSR would end up being applied to a more traditional HR block signalling system.

Almost unnoticed these targets were included in the 2015 National Transport Finance Plan[18]; and absorbed into the later procurement process.  One can see that in that 2015 document, 4tph was a requirement for both the Coryton Line and City Line (even though the City Line requirement was a challenge).  I think setting out the targets in this way back in 2015 was pretty fundamental to avoid us scaling back during the procurement process.

However, after I had left WG early in 2016, some of these targets were inexplicably watered down, especially those related to services on the Coryton Line in Cardiff.   This for me, was an essential safety net for the Metro project in 2015.  Although nearly 8 years later in 2023/4, these targets and how they were overcomplicated and interpreted in timetable specification of what is still a HR system using block signalling, albeit using Light Rail Vehicles (LRVs), have become a bit of a millstone.

So, with ERDF support the Metro became a £734m capital project; with approx. £136M from ERDF, £125M from DfT and the remaining £445M from WG. Interesting to note that in 2024, with the project now estimated to cost over £1Bn, it is I believe only WG who are taking on the vast majority of additional capital commitments (not DfT or ERDF); as I state elsewhere, this capital funding is from a WG block grant from Westminster that does not include any hypothecated provision for rail infrastructure investment in Wales.

I also worked to encourage integrating a City Deal with the Metro.  The City Deal was a “wrap around” that for me engaged HMT in the project and so would help keep the Department for Transport honest and minimise the risks of them reducing their commitment.  This for me worked, however, as a non-devolved matter, then as now, in theory the DfT should have covered the majority of the costs.  

I was still attending the CCR Board and providing “informal” briefings on the Metro.   My confidential briefing note to the CCR Board in May 2015[19] set out my thinking at that time.  I also had plenty of informal discussion with the Welsh Government Finance team and others – people like Andrew Jeffreys, Steve Davies, Darryn Lewis and Jo Salway who were a help to me. I also reached out to MPs like the recently elected Craig Williams of Cardiff north who was very supportive of the City Deal.  The City Deal[20] was eventually agreed in 2016 and wrapped around the core Metro funding already committed adding a further £460M as part of £1.2Bn programme.  My hope at that time was, like in the Stuttgart region, that the Cardiff Capital region would allocate the majority of this additional funding to “more Metro”.

There was also another route which helped at a policy level during my time at Welsh Government, and that was the development of the Well Being of Future Generation Act. I recall meeting talking to Chris Roberts who was working with the Minister Carl Sergeant on the development and legislation of the Act and its supporting guidance. We discussed the inclusion of reference to connected communities and by implication that greater public transport accessibility was a key consideration; I suspect this further policy driver of Metro also helped get the project over the line.

5.12 Progress and launching the Metro in November 2015

Looking back, it is easy for me and others, to underestimate how tough a challenge the “Metro concept” was for Welsh Government. So, I have to acknowledge what a remarkable job James Price and his senior officials did to eventually help to make the Metro happen.  Once their initial reticence to a more ambitious project was taken away by the First Minister, they really got stuck in. I don’t know when, and James Price may tell a different story, but after the failing of the original VLE process and UK Government withdrawal of their ££, James Price played a fundamental role in brokering the deal with the DfT for a Valley Line upgrade at the end of 2014.  This combined with the FM endorsement of the Metro in Spring 2015, made the space we needed to make progress.

So, by mid-2015 plans were developed to establish Transport for Wales (which would be led initially by Geoff Ogden), and initial engagement with industry began to help shape the upcoming W&B procurement. Welsh Government would put the requirements for Metro in that process. At an industry engagement event in Summer 2015 I made one of the opening presentations at the Millenium Stadium.   Innovatively James Price and the team (now including Simon Jones and procurement experts like Ben Hutchinson and Tony Meacham – with support from the likes of Gareth Morgan, Andrew Jones, Simon Lander amongst others– and later Richard Briggs of Motts) developed an output-based mode agnostic procurement process; more I suspect to address objections from ORR, DfT and the Unions.  We were not forcing a LR Metro system, we would let industry present us with options.   I was never 100% comfortable with that approach (after all I “knew” what we needed!) but acknowledge this was perhaps the only way of navigating the institutional barriers in what was and still is (in 2024) a non-devolved responsibility. 

The content of the meetings and letters exchanged in November 2015, between James Price (then Director of Welsh Government’s Economy, Skills and Natural Resources Group), Mark Carne (CEO of Network Rail) and the then Sir Peter Hendy (Chair of Network Rail) exemplify Welsh Government’s and James Price’s challenge in dealing with the English rail ecosystem. I can see that James Price and WG had to tread a careful path.

In November 2015 the Metro was launched at Pontypridd Station. I prepared some Metro reports for Welsh Government called, “Rolling out our Metro” and commissioned some glossy videos from Bomper Studio which TfW have made use of right up to 2022. The Metro maps were tweaked again by both WSP and Alex Frew of Smorgasbord who has taken my original scrawl to create the CCR Metro map. I also have to mentioned Toby Mason, Stephanie Ferry and Mathew Perryman from WG, and Lewis Brencher then of ATW, who helped with that launch event and the subsequent public information campaign, and the support of Freshwater and people like Amy Griffiths, Vicky Beech of Smorgasbord and Jamie Adams of Fernleigh Design.  Alex Frew and Ben Freeman of Smorgasbord also helped prepare and design the Metro brochures. Also, interesting to note who else was involved that day – and still involved now, albeit in different roles; so aside from James Price and I, Robert Holmes, Lewis Brencher and Sam Hadley (then of NR) amongst others.

It’s worth just reflecting the amount of time, work and effort required that preceded the launch of Metro in November 2015. Today, I still hear complaints from others talking about lack of investment in other schemes in Wales and that its “not fair” that so much is being invested in the South Wales Metro. I am pretty sure most of those making such calls have little knowledge or experience of the work, effort and advocacy required to secure political support and funding for a major project like the Metro.  I hope this book provides something of a template or handbook in that regard.

Figure 68 Nov 2015 version of “Metro” map

Figure 69 Mark Barry, 2015,  Welsh Government “Rolling Out Our Metro[21]“

Figure 70 Metro Launch Nov 2015, FMs Briefing

Figure 71 Selected Images from Metro launch at Pontypridd station October 2015

The actual press event in the rain at Pontypridd station  Figure 71 was pivotal for me. After a few more months working with the newly established TfW I felt my work was done…and I left WG/TfW. 

How naive I was.

One of my last contributions to colleagues at WG was a presentation at an internal WG/TfW meeting aimed to inform and energise the team being assembled. This slide Figure 72 Slide from my WG PPT in December 2015 (the end date has slipped a little!) was my humorous take on a future Metro opening day; not sure who is James or who am I either.

I also prepared a more formal paper setting out some of the potential wider benefits and opportunities of Metro.  These were nothing to do with the actual transport  system, which was the enabler and catalyst in my view, and set out opportunities re: land use, planning, regeneration, transit-oriented development  and a more joined up approach across such matters and transport planning.  These are still things we still struggle to address holistically today.

Figure 72 Slide from my WG PPT in December 2015 (the end date has slipped a little!)

Back to: 4 Developing a Cardiff Capital Region Metro Vision 2010-2013

Navigation

Next page: 6 Buying and building a Metro 2016-2024

References

[1] December 2013 presentation to WG Transport Team, Metro Summary for EST V1.3.pdf

[2]          Welsh Government, 2015 Written Statement – Cardiff Capital Region Report (12 February 2015) | GOV.WALES

[3]          Cardiff Capital Region, 2016, The City Deal – Cardiff Capital Region

[4]          The “Cardiff City Region Unit” was offered by CU and WG to support the City Region Board.  It was led by Marcella Maxwell, and later by Helen Davies and Stephen Layne from WG, from Cardiff University Jayne Coleman provided admin support and David Waite research services; CCR/Metro Branding work also supported by WG via Claire Chappell and Mari Stevens 

[5]          WG 2014, South Wales Metro Update, August 2014,  South Wales Metro: update (August 2014) | GOV.WALES

[6]          Auditor General Wales, 2016, “Welsh Government investment in rail services and infrastructure”

[7]          HoC, Welsh Affairs Selected Committee, 2017, “The cancellation of rail electrification in South Wales”

[8]          HoC Public Accounts Committee, 2017 Failings on Great Western upgrade raise concerns over future rail projects – Committees – UK Parliament

[9]          BBC News, March 2011, London-Cardiff rail electrification, but not to Swansea – BBC News
BBC News, March 2011, Appeal over electrifying rail line to Swansea – BBC News

[10]        BBC News, July 2012, Rail electrification to Swansea and south Wales valleys – BBC News

[11]        Sion Barry, Western Mail, March 2014, Electrification of Valley Lines could cost Welsh Government £600m

[12]        BBC News, November 2014, David Cameron ‘delighted’ with Valleys lines rail deal – BBC News
Welsh Government Written Statement, November 2014, Written Statement – Update on Rail Electrification and Rail Franchise (25 November 2014) | GOV.WALES
Sion Barry, Western Mail, November 2014, South Wales rail electrification scheme gets £230m government go-ahead

[13]        BBC News, July 2017, Rail electrification plans scrapped by government – BBC News

[14]        Kevin Smith, International Railway Journal, 2020, Network Rail completes Great Western electrification

[15]        Chris Gibb is a well-known and very knowledgeable and experienced figure in  the UK rail industry. He was MD of Wales and Borders 1997-2003 and later Virgin Traina, he later advised TfW 2015-2021 and became an NED to Network Rail.  He has also opined insightfully on “how to fix” HS2. (1) Chris Gibb | LinkedIn

[16]        ORR,  Exclusions from mainline railway requirements | Office of Rail and Road (orr.gov.uk)

[17]        City Line 2tph and Cardiff West junction are still a problem in 2024! Cardiff West Junction… – Mark Barry, 2024

[18]        Welsh Government, 2015 National transport finance plan 2015 | GOV.WALES

[19]        M Barry briefing note to CCR Board, May 2015 Metro – Briefing Note for City Region Board April 2015 D1.0.pdf

[20]        Cardiff Capital Region, City Deal 2016, The City Deal – Cardiff Capital Region

[21]        (Mark Barry)Welsh Government, 2015, “Rolling out our Metro”  south-wales-Metro-brochure.pdf (gov.wales)