Before I dive into my story of the Metro from 2010 through to 2024, I’d like to set out some of the context and background that compelled me to get involved back in 2010, especially the failings of the UK and Welsh rail industry ecosystem.
In this chapter I cover:
- 1.1 First, a little history
- 1.2 The Light Rail proposals of the 1990s
- 1.3 Welsh Government, SRA Franchise & Cardiff Rapid Transit
- 1.4 Network Rail obfuscation
- 1.5 The lack of PTA/PTE was beginning to show
- 1.6 Others could see some of what was needed
- 1.7 The biggest devolution mistake?
- 1.8 Getting my “Metro Head” on
- References
1.1 First, a little history
“South Wales Needs a Plan”[1], by Professor Hilary Adair Marquand of Cardiff University, was published in 1936, and set out the existential economic challenge presented by the decline of Wales major industry, coal, and the need for investment in its economic infrastructure to grow its economy. Marquand specifically identified the need for investment in commuter rail and electrification as these quotes illustrate…
“ … a more rapid movement of population up and down the valleys must be encouraged, so as to save the inhabitants of the northern towns from economic isolation. How that rapidity of movement can best be secured should be decided by an authority responsible for a co-ordinated transport service throughout the Region. No such authority exists. (p48)
“…. perhaps the Ministry of Transport could be asked to report whether it would be best to electrify the railways.”
“With rapid transport, it should be no more difficult for workers from Aberdare or Ebbw Vale to reach Cardiff or Newport than it is for clerks to travel to their daily work in the City of London from Wimbledon or Ealing”
…” political and social institutions have failed to adopt themselves with sufficient rapidity to the economic changes that have taken place. One small symptom of this is the maintenance of local government boundaries which have long lost their significance and of authorities which are inadequate to the larger tasks which need to be undertaken.”(p209).
Marquand’s analysis was endorsed nearly ten years later in a compilation of regional reports submitted to the UK Government and edited by Michael Fogarty[2], which stated in respect of Cardiff and southeast Wales…
“The main need is for a better transport service. On the railways faster local services are needed; the present slow services are largely responsible for what one report calls the ‘invisible line across mid-Glamorgan beyond which industrialists are reluctant to go’. Electrification would probably prove to be the main step towards a solution.”
Chris Sutton[3], who played a key role in early Metro development, introduced me to Marquand’s book in 2013, the title of which is clearly still relevant today. I often refer to it, as it demonstrates how poor governments in London and Cardiff have been for decades (until now) in doing what should be obvious in respect of public transport investment, and especially rail, to support our economy
Today, the climate emergency, urgently requires us to reduce our car dependency by: investing in and encouraging public transport, reducing the subsidy enjoyed by car owners and users (See The Climate Emergency and car dependency) and encouraging more development and regeneration around our public transport networks (See Why we need Transit Oriented Development (TOD)).
Given the need for much more public transport capacity, it is depressing to look back at the rail network that existed in the wider Cardiff Region at the time of Marquand’s book. Every valley had at least one rail line, some had more Figure 2; there were cross valley links and a rail line along the heads of the valleys. In fact, we pretty much had a Metro network.
This proliferation of coal railways is entirely consistent with Wales’s role as the crucible of the industrial revolution and the location for the world’s first steam railway[4]. It was at the Penydarren Ironworks on 21 February 1804, that Richard Trevithick constructed and operated a steam railway locomotive engine to haul 10 tons of iron and 70 men along 10 miles of tramway. Wales is no stranger to innovation, especially in rail.
Sadly, given the slow decline in coal freight, the onset of the car age and the Marples[5] inspired Beeching cuts[6] of the 1960s, much of this industrial rail infrastructure was pulled up and then built over Figure 3. Fortunately, given the survival of the coal industry into the 1990s, at least a fragment remained to provide the basis for what has become the “South Wales Metro”. The work of the Valleys Line unit of British Rail (BR), under the leadership of John Davies in the 1980s, helped keep the network alive.
Figure 2 Rail network in South Wales ~1910[7]
Figure 3 Post War Rail closures – From Clark & Davies, “The Peoples Railway”[8]
In considering transport interventions required, we have to reflect the economic geography of Cardiff and its wider Capital Region. The Cardiff local authority has a population of about 383,000[9] at the heart of a wider city region of 1.6M, most of whom live in urban high-density settlements (the Cardiff Bulit Area of about 470,000 has a density of 43pph[10], the Rhondda valley is higher still at 47pph). Post Covid 65,000 people a day[11] still commute into Cardiff as part of a working population of 240,000. When one adds another 400,000 working in the wider region then there is ample reason to make the case for vastly improved public transport provision – and a Metro. In fact, given the density and layout of most settlements, with each valley north of Cardiff having an urban footprint of maybe 10-15Km in length and often less than a 1Km wide, then this region is topologically more suited to segregated high-capacity public transport than nearly anywhere else in the UK.
Figure 4 Urban extent in CCR – from CCR Passenger Rail Vision [12]
In that context, the fact that it has taken over 80 years since the publication of Marquand’s book to actually begin to deliver on some of its transport recommendations in the Cardiff Capital Region is pretty stark and worthy of reflection; especially the failings of the UK rail industry ecosystem in respect of Wales (See The Rail Industry, Wales and HS2).
1.2 The Light Rail proposals of the 1990s
The failings of the UK rail industry ecosystem in my memory go back to the 1990s. Before the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) was wound up, it had developed plans for a Light Rail (LR) line to Cardiff Bay from the city centre, linked to some of the valley line services. These proposals were set out in a CBDC design brief[13] in 1992 and 1993 which also included some illustrations and maps of the proposed system Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8. These proposals were linked to a major landscaping and urban realm project for the entire Bute Street/Collingdon Rd corridor.
The vision was to create a linear park, lined with buildings of 7/8 stories, with a Light Rail line running the full length of “Bute Avenue”, connecting the bay and city centre (later renamed Lloyd George Avenue[14]). There was talk at the time, a little misplaced in my view, of a creating a “Las Ramblas” between Cardiff City Centre and Cardiff Bay. Those who remember the CBDC, will recall that one of its primary objectives as set out in the vision for Cardiff Bay in 1988[15] was “to reunite the city with its waterfront”. The treatment and reconfiguration of the bay rail line was, in my view, fundamental to realising the vision.
Figure 5 From CBDC 1992 – The Square
Figure 6 From 1993 CBDC – Bay Line/Lloyd George Avenue Light Rail
Figure 7 From 1993 CBDC – Urban Realm illustration Lloyd George Avenue
Figure 88 From CBDC 1992 Bute Avenue Development Framework
CBDC further developed those LR proposal via a Halcrow study Figure 9 in 1996.However, disappointingly, UK Government stymied those nascent plans, leading to a less ambitious plan for the Cardiff Valley Lines operated by Prism Rail following the issue of the first post privatisation franchise in 1997. The Cardiff valleys route was eventually merged into a single franchise for Wales introduced by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA)[16] in 2001.
The decisions of distant officials in 1996/7 also stymied more ambitious plans to enhance the urban realm on Bute Street/Bay line corridor for thirty years and left Cardiff with the legacy of the completely inappropriate Lloyd George Avenue dual carriageway, the “Flourish” (which is the roundabout and fountain at the southern end of Lloyd George Avenue) and retention of the heavy rail barrier between Butetown and Atlantic Wharf.
I also think Cardiff County Council (CCC) and CBDC must take some responsibility as the major transport investment in the area was allocated to the Butetown road tunnel and not public transport. As a consequence, the vision set out by the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation was never realised and one of the primary objectives of the CBDC, “to connect the city with its waterfront” was stymied for a generation.
Of relevance today, in 2024 and via current plans, is the need to properly engage and develop regeneration initiatives in Butetown to complement the initial Cardiff Crossrail proposals[17]. This is not just about bricks and mortar interventions, but of the harder social regeneration that has to be co-curated with the local community. This is something perhaps the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation failed to do effectively.
Figure 9 Cardiff Light Rail Phase 1- Alignment study 1996 by Halcrow for CBDC
1.3 Welsh Government, SRA Franchise & Cardiff Rapid Transit
Despite the negative impact of such decisions, there were nonetheless progressive ideas and schemes in play in Wales in the early days of devolution, as exemplified in the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation’s (CBDC) Light Rail (LR) proposal in the 1990s. Later, even without formal powers, the Welsh Government (WG) set out a coherent transport plan in 2001[18] under the leadership of Minister Sue Essex, which included some space for rail enhancements such as 4tph for urban rail services – something still not yet confirmed for Cardiff as part of the current Metro plans – and the application of LR in Cardiff Bay. These requirements Figure 10 Figure 11 and as set out in a formal Welsh Assembly Government paper[19], were intended to flow into the upcoming Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) led franchise procurement for Wales and Borders rail services.
That SRA franchising process suffered a series of false starts after eight companies were pre-qualified in Jan 2002[20], one of whom I believe also set out LR plans for the Valley Lines. Disappointingly, the SRA eventually awarded the now infamous “no growth” franchise to Arriva Trains Wales for the “Wales and Borders” services in August 2003.
The aspirations set out by Sue Essex just two years earlier were pretty much ignored. In fact, it was probably pressure from Rail Passenger Committee Wales that ensured the franchise was “no growth” instead of “reduced scope and fewer services” some felt SRA would have preferred; bad as it was, it could have been worse.
Figure 10 WG Rail “Vision” in 2001, “The Transport Framework for Wales” #1
Figure 11 WG Rail “Vision” in 2001, “The Transport Framework for Wales” #2
The SRA franchising process was criticised by the Welsh Affairs Select Committee in 2004[21] who were particularly concerned over the scoring system and visibility of the procurement, of the limited funds made available to improve rail services/infrastructure as well as the then National Assembly’s limited powers over rail services and the SRA.
The withering critique[22] by the Welsh Affairs Select Committee in 2017 of that 2003 SRA decision is also pretty unambiguous.
“The low-level specification under which the 2003 franchise was let has resulted in the people of Wales and Borders being deprived of many improvements that could have been expected during its 15-year term. This has been exacerbated by the fact that whilst the franchise did not allow for growth, passenger numbers have increased by approximately 75% during that time. Whilst efforts and investments have been made to cope with the increase in demand, this has come at a higher cost than would have been expected at the outset of the franchise. We agree with the Ministers who have described awarding the franchise based on a zero-growth contract as a huge failure.”
The legacy of another distant London decision in 2003 has been a depreciated network in Wales, using old unreliable rolling stock that is still having an impact in 2024, over twenty years later.
One of the witnesses to the 2017 enquiry also suggested that in 2003, the pressure on the DfT budget as a result of cost overruns on the multibillion-pound upgrade of the West Coast main line (WCML) negatively impacted how much resource could be allocated to the rail network and services in Wales. Roll on twenty years, and because of the non-devolved status of the rail network in Wales, the cost overruns on HS2, despite its cutbacks, are having exactly the same impact on rail investment in Wales by UK Government.
In 2004, probably in response to those decisions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Cardiff Council initiated A Rapid Transit Study[23] to explore new systems and services across the city. However, the institutional constraints, lack of funding and perhaps a little lack of ambition of the city’s administration in 2006, eventually put pay to those plans, as this letter I received from Cardiff Council at the time demonstrates Figure 12 .
Figure 12 Letter from CCC to Mark Barry in 2006 re Rapid Transit Study
1.4 Network Rail obfuscation
Another fine example of the issue of the long-term depreciation of Wales’s economic infrastructure was manifest in a letter I eventually received in 2008 via my MP Jenny Willott from Ian Coucher, the CEO of Network Rail (NR) at that time (See Appendices, Correspondence with Ian Coucher (CEO NR) & Jenny Willott (MP)). These kinds of briefings are still common and misleading MPs today, as I set out in The Rail Industry, Wales and HS2.
Even then, whilst I was still running the biotech company I founded and for me, before “Metro”, I was deeply frustrated by the lack of enhancement investment in Cardiff and Wales’s rail network and the inability to actually get any meaningful data on the subject. It was pretty clear to me, even then, that the Valley Lines, running old unreliable diesel stock, had two possible futures; a major upgrade and enhancement or closure. Just adding more incremental sticking plasters was not sustainable.
For those not familiar with the rail industry, enhancement investment is typically used to expand the capability of the railway so it can carry more trains, more quickly and carry more people. This includes new stations, double tracking, electrification and big schemes like HS2.
Ian and Network Rail’s PR response was typical and often used to deflect such questions. I was told that they didn’t maintain data at a Wales level, but they were doing a great job on Operations Maintenance and Renewal (OMR) investment in Wales. OMR investment is about maintaining the railway’s current capability and safe operations – so includes things like renewing points, signalling and upgrading track, etc. It was a good PR spin letter but failed to acknowledge the fundamental issue – that being the lack of any meaningful enhancement investment versus what was, and still is, happening elsewhere on the UK Rail network. At that time, in DfT & NR terms, Wales didn’t exist. The situation is only marginally better today in that data has been maintained by ORR[24] and the industry for the Wales Route since 2011, but is often hidden when presented as part of Network Rail’s Wales and West Division. This also exemplifies the poverty of longer-term ambition and limited enhancement investment in Wales’s rail network[25]. Then, as now (in 2024), most rail issues (and especially investment in the network) are not devolved and the responsibility of the UK Government at Westminster. It remains to be seen whether the new Labour Government at Westminster in 2024 will address this issue. More starkly there was limited institutional capacity and capability to take on major public transport projects in Cardiff and southeast Wales. This was not the case elsewhere in the UK.
1.5 The lack of PTA/PTE was beginning to show
In 1968 the UK Government’s Transport Act[26] had enabled the creation of Passenger Transport Authorities (PTA) and Passenger Transport Executives (PTE). Some then these bodies have helped transform public transport (PT) in places like Newcastle and Manchester via the Tyne and Wear Metro (1970s) and Metrolink in Manchester (1990s). These bodies had statutory powers and were resourced to develop and deliver regional public transport. Whilst they all suffered a serious blow when the UK Government led by Margaret Thatcher de-regulated and fragmented the bus industry in the 1980s via the Transport Acts of 1980 and 1985[27] (especially as regards demand for bus services when compared to London Figure 13) Passenger Transport Authorities, nonetheless, had the skills, capability, capacity and political remit to bring forward strategic regional schemes.
However, PTA/PTEs were never established in In Cardiff/SE Wales (nor in Bristol for that matter which has suffered in a similar way over the last 40 year) and for me resulted in limited investment in public transport infrastructure for decades. One has to marvel how Nottingham managed to develop its tram network despite also not having a PTA; I am sure this is a story worth telling. Similarly, one also has to ask why so little progress has been made in Leeds despite having a PTA. Albeit West Yorkshire Metro Mayor Tracy Brabin is now applying the vision and leadership[28] to remedy this failing to help develop and deliver mass transit across the whole of West Yorkshire. Whether the UK Government in London will step up with the at least £2Bn needed, remains to be seen.
Figure 13 UK bus patronage – from, “Building a World Class Bus System for Britain”[29]
Even after the Senedd was established in 1999, rail powers were not included in the devolution settlement (wrong then and still wrong now) resulting in a very tactical, non-statutory process being wrapped around Welsh Government (WG). It also meant, subconsciously perhaps (and despite Sue Essex’s efforts) that WG focussed on developing and implementing schemes where it did have powers – namely roads. In fact, it is only really since about 2015, when the Metro was confirmed and soon after the Active Travel act[30] and Well Being of Future Generations Act[31], that Welsh Government started to think more strategically about transport schemes other than roads. This became most manifest in its decision to cancel the M4 Relief Road in 2021[32], the 2021 Transport Strategy, Llwybr Newydd[33] and in its response to 2023 to the Roads Review[34], all emphasising prioritising Active Travel and Public Transport over roads Figure 14.
I also think we have to look back at that period and ask even with the constitutional constraints, and institutional weakness (e.g., no PTA/PTE) whether Welsh Government and local authorities could have done more, and in so doing address more politically challenging issues such as car parking and costs thereof, provision of bus lanes, etc; let alone land use and planning decisions.
Figure 14 Welsh Government, 2022 Llwybr Newydd, mobility priorities
1.6 Others could see some of what was needed
Despite the challenges there have been some bright spots. For example, the pre-devolution work of the then South and Mid Glamorgan County Councils who had worked with British Rail to introduce passenger services on the City Line in Cardiff and to re-introduce them to Aberdare back in the 1980s as well as enabling broader rolling stock and timetable changes. The guiding mind and role of John Davies, who managed the Valley Lines for BR in the 1980s cannot be understated. Rhodri Clark and John Davies’s book, “The People’s Railway”[35] outlines work which was probably an essential foundation for today’s Metro, given it safeguarded a range of local services.
Later, despite the constitutional constraints, and the limited support from UK Government, Welsh Government funded the reinstatement of passenger service to the Vale of Glamorgan (VoG) line in 2005 and the Ebbw Valley Line in 2008. The southeast Wales Transport Alliance (SEWTA) and its predecessor bodies (SWIFT and TIGER) had successfully made the case for those re-openings and were also trying to articulate the case for further schemes[36]. Although it has to be noted that SEWTA did not really present or advocate for any of the earlier more ambitious transformative schemes for Cardiff set out by the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation or Cardiff Council.
Reflecting the earlier ambition of CBDC, Network Rail, via the efforts of individuals like Gary Draisey and Alan Wilkins working with Cardiff Council, had also brought forward ideas for new connections across Cardiff Bay using tram-train as far back as 2009, and extended the concept to Newport to make use of the underutilised freight lines in both cities Figure 15 Figure 16.
Figure 15 NR slides (Gary Draisey) for concept Newport-Cardiff Tram-train~2009/10
However, in my view all these efforts, whilst worthy and which did bring forward some tactical improvements, were stymied by a long-standing fundamental weakness in the institutional transport ecosystem in southeast Wales, especially as regards rail.
Aside from CCC, SEWTA and NR there were others articulating the case for more public transport investment in Wales. Most notably, Prof Stuart Cole (who has been advocating for rail and public transport far longer than me) has set out plenty of ambitious ideas, including in a 2009 a report[37] exploring future rail infrastructure in Wales (which also included Light Rail proposals). He also explored the case for faster Cardiff-London journey times and electrification in 2003[38]. His influence also extends beyond rail. He championed the dial up Bwcabws concept in the 2000s that provided the inspiration for TfW’s Fflecsi[39] services, he has opined on airports, fares, roads, integration and has submitted numerous papers to committees in Cardiff Bay[40] and Westminster over the last 30 years.
Figure 16 Excerpts from 2010 CCC, NR, Motts Cardiff Bay Tram-train study #1
Despite such advocacy, in southeast Wales, formal candidate rail enhancement schemes were typically based on a collation of lists from each local authority with progress based on smaller scale incremental, measures. The regional transport consortia like SEWTA did provide some semblance of a strategic approach, but they had no statutory powers and were not funded or resourced in the same way as a PTA/PTE in England; and not all local authorities fully engaged with these arrangements. So, there was no prospect of any strategic large-scale programme like the current Metro project in the Cardiff Capital Region. Wales at the time did not have the institutional capability or funding to take forward the Metro.
I raised such issues with politicians from all parties at the time, including Alun Cairns, David Melding, Andrew Davies, Rhodri Morgan, Byron Davies, Jenny Rathbone and others, who were all very receptive to my assertions, but seemed to me not really able to effect the change we needed given that powers, funding and key decisions were and are still, based at Whitehall. It is worth repeating that in January 2010, the Enterprise and Learning Committee’s report on rail in Wales[41] concluded:
This inquiry has left us with the distinct impression that Wales is not getting its fair share of investment in rail infrastructure, or getting it fast enough: programmes to electrify track, to improve stations and to upgrade rolling stock seem destined to reach Wales well behind other parts of the UK.
It is also disappointing to reflect that multiple committees at Cardiff Bay and Westminster (many of which I and people like Stuart Cole contributed evidence to) have drawn similar conclusions over the last twenty years.
Wales voted for devolution in 1997 but the suboptimal institutional arrangements for investing in and managing the rail network in Wales were never amended to reflect that democratic decision. Why? The rail network is a fundamental part of Wales’s economic infrastructure and should have been treated like the road network and included in the devolution settlement. The new UK Labour Government elected in July 2024, has the opportunity to address this issue.
1.7 The biggest devolution mistake?
Looking back, the 2004 decision by the Labour led Welsh Government, not to take on all the rail powers offered by the then Labour Government in London, was I think one of the biggest mistakes of the devolution era and reflects poorly on the advice given to Welsh Ministers by officials at that time. Scotland grabbed the opportunity with both hands.
The Railways Act 2005[42] enshrined the new arrangements, with Scottish Ministers taking full control of Scotland’s network and services. Whilst Welsh Minister gained some control over services and an ability to invest in the network, all the main powers and funding re: cross border services and especially rail infrastructure remained with the Secretary of State in London.
The letter from Ieuan Wyn Jones – then Deputy First Minister in the coalition government-, to the Senedd Enterprise and Learning Committee in 2009 Figure 17 Figure 18 tries to explain why that happened, but in fact illuminates the limited thinking within Welsh Government on this subject. The letter is clearly very much a bureaucratic response rather than a political one and in late 2024/2025, we risk making the same mistake again.
One of the reasons given to not take powers was the integrated nature of the Wales and England rail network. This is a little embarrassing, as plenty of other countries manage cross border infrastructure in an equitable and even-handed way; in fact, this is normal. For example, Aachen, Liege and Maastricht, three cities in three countries less than 40km apart, all with high levels of cross border rail infrastructure and services. The Basel tram system straddles three countries, one of which, Switzerland, is not even on the EU (although it is in Schengen and European Free Trade Association EFTA). In all cases, each country has an equitable involvement in how cross border infrastructure and services are managed and/or enhanced.
Disappointingly, some people still use that excuse today. Whilst I can understand that those less informed might have an excuse to do so, those with a little more knowledge, especially in the rail industry, do not and are adopting a rather patronising position in my view.
In contrast, apart now from the Core Valley Lines (CVL), Wales has limited influence on decisions related to investment in the rail asset in Wales. All major decisions in terms of rail enhancements and funding thereof, reside in Whitehall, often with little or no discussion with Welsh Government.
The equally unnecessary conflation of how network liabilities are managed with decisions on enhancement investment, is also rather myopic. The real concerns officials had and still have over infrastructure risks and liabilities (e.g., the continual flooding of the Conwy Vally line) should be separate from funding and responsibility thereof for enhancement and operations maintenance and renewal (OMR) investment – which need to be more localised across England as well as being devolved to Wales and Scotland. If the “Union” is to mean anything surely each devolved government (including the regions of England) could “pay” the treasury a sort of infrastructure risk premium to ensure that no part of the UK is exposed to a disproportionate financial cost should there be an issue requiring significant remediation.
When reflecting on Welsh Government’s attuite at that time, their reluctance to taking on more responsibility for rail is perhaps understandable. In 2005 Welsh Government was empowered and more capable of designing and building roads. There was very limited rail experience and capability, so it is not surprising that Welsh Ministers were advised by their officials to decline. Oh, what if.
I wonder how much more progress we could have made in Walers in terms of rail enhancement investment had we accepted those powers, as Scotland did, in 2005 and so receive full Barnett treatment for all English rail spend. Welsh Government’s analysis of historical rail enhancement investment[43] from 2001 and projected, based on current commitments to 2029 (end of CP7), suggests that Wales has lost out on at least £3bn of rail enhancement investment over that period (and will lose more beyond that point resulting from HS2, NPR, TRU etc). Decisions clearly have consequences. (To note from 2001 to end 2023 this figure was approximately £2Bn)
This brings to me a quote, reputedly by Richard Branson,
“If somebody offers you an amazing opportunity but you are not sure you can do it, say yes – then learn how to do it later”.
If only! (See The Rail Industry, Wales and HS2 for a full explanation)
Figure 17 Letter from Ieuan Wyn Jones to Enterprise and Learning Committee in 2009 – P1 of 2
Figure 18 Letter from Ieuan Wyn Joners to Enterprise and Learning Committee in 2009- P2 of 2
1.8 Getting my “Metro Head” on
It was in 2008/2009 (when I was still CEO of the biotech company Q Chip I had co-founded in 2003) and into 2010, that I started to engage more actively, Welsh Government and Cardiff Council on the subject of transport, connectivity, economic development, planning and the urban realm. I still had a “bee in my bonnet” about Lloyd George Avenue and the need to develop a solution more in keeping with the original CBDC vision from the early 1990s, as well as transport issues in the wider region (as my email to Wales Transport Plan Consultation in 2009 exemplifies (See Appendices Mark Barry submission to Wales Transport Consultation 2009). I have a whole range of documents and emails from that time; some are included in the appendices. I was also engaged by the Welsh Assembly Government’s Minister for Enterprise, Innovation and Networks in 2007/8 on a Task & Finish Group exploring publicly funded commercialisation activities and associated resulting intellectual property(IP)[44]. I was asked to join by its chair, Simon Gibson[45], given I was at that time, CEO of a biotechnology start up in Cardiff (Q Chip Ltd), which in part was based on IP developed by Cardiff University.
These interactions also put me in contact with James Price at Welsh Government (not long after he returned from One North East[46] I think); again, as it turns out, our paths had first crossed briefly back in 2002 whilst we were at the Welsh Development Agency (WDA), and me very briefly. I was actually escorted out of the WDA building on Kingsway in 2003 just a year after joining them from PA Consulting in London, but that is another story for another time. I don’t have any rose-tinted spectacles for the WDA. Although, as I set out later (See 11.6 A Metro Development Corporation?), the loss of the capacity and capability of the land development and regeneration teams, has left a gap in Wales.
The decades of rail underinvestment and my increasing interest were all contributory reasons for why I “got involved.” Wales needed to think and act bigger to address some of the fundamental weaknesses in its economic infrastructure and avoid the disappointment of incremental homogeneous mediocrity (a phrase I coined to conclude my first Meto report in 2011) that had characterised, in my view, much of Wales for too long. Another local saying which I think is also apt, and coined by Geraint Talfan Davies I believe, was that Wales is the land of the pulled punch. It seemed clear to me that such a circumspect approach would not be effective in this endeavour.
The following quote by the famous American Architect Daniel Burnham, which Tim Williams[47] made me aware of in 2022, I think aptly explains my thinking….
“Make no little plans. They have no magic to stir men’s blood and probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans; aim high in hope and work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram once recorded will never die, but long after we are gone will be a living thing, asserting itself with ever-growing insistency.
Sure, I was naïve (you have to be to take on these things) but having spent a number of years working in Management Consultancy and having founded and secured funding for a start-up biotechnology company, I was also thick skinned and confident enough to try. Having lived and/or worked in Manchester, London, Milan and travelled for work to many places like Stuttgart, Milan, Berlin, New York, Washington, Copenhagen, etc that had all clearly managed to secure much more investment in local and regional public transport, it was clear to me that we were doing something wrong. As I explain in more detail later, this also extended to UK Government’s custodianship of Welsh railways.
References
[1] Marquand HA, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1936 “South Wales Needs a Plan”
[2] MP Fogarty, Methuen, 1945, “Prospects of Industrial Areas of Great Britain”
[3] Chris Sutton at that time was a lead Director at JLL in Cardiff, Chair of the Cardiff Central Enterprise Zone and later Chair of the CBI in Wales; he introduced me to Marquand’s book, “South Wales Needs a Plan” in 2012
[4] Britannica, Richard Trevithick | Inventor of Steam Locomotive & High-Pressure Steam Engine | Britannica
Amgueddfa Cymru, Richard Trevithick’s steam locomotive | Museum Wales
[5] Ernest Marples was the Conservative UK Government Transport Minister who instigated and enacted the rail closure recommendations of the Beeching Commission; some suggest he had a major conflict of interest as he was a key player in the Marples Ridgway construction firm which was involved in building some of the UKs major road schemes in the late 1950s and early 1960s
[6] Beeching, British Transport Commission, March 1963, “The Reshaping of British Railways”.
[7] From Bartholemew, 1903 “The Survey Atlas of England and Wales”
[8] John Davies & Rhodri Clark, Platform 5, 1996, “Valley Lines – The Peoples Railway – The Inside Story of a Train Business 1983-1993”
[9] Stats Wales Mid Yr Pop Estimate update July 2023, Population estimates by local authority, region and year
[10] Thomas Brinkhoff, Urban Population (updated with 2021 ONS Census data) United Kingdom: Countries and Major Urban Areas – Population Statistics, Maps, Charts, Weather and Web Information (citypopulation.de)
[11] Stats Wales, Local Authority Commuting data Commuting patterns by Welsh local authority and measure (gov.wales)
[12] Mark Barry, Cardiff Capital Region, 2021, “Passenger Rail Vision” appendix-2-passenger-rail-vision-final.pdf
[13] Christopher Glaister and Company (with Ove Arup, TPA & Chestertons) for CBDC, 1993, Design Brief, “Bridge/Bute Avenue, Development Framework Report”
[14] Mark Barry, 2018, South Wales Metro & Lloyd George Avenue – Mark Barry (swalesMetroprof.blog)
[15] Llewelyn Davies, CBDC, 1988 ,”Cardiff Bay Regeneration Strategy”
[16] Strategic Rail Authority (SRA)founded by UK Labour Government in 2000 as a shadow authority and given statutory powers in 2001 via the 2000 Transport Act
[17] Mark Barry, Blog 2018, “South Wales Metro and Lloyd George Avenue” South Wales Metro & Lloyd George Avenue – Mark Barry (swalesMetroprof.blog)
Mark Barry Blog 2019, “A Cardiff Crossrail” A Cardiff Crossrail… – Mark Barry (swalesMetroprof.blog)
[18] Welsh Government. 2001, “The Transport Framework for Wales”
[19] Welsh Government, 2002, Guide to Franchise Bidder (submission to Welsh Assembly) Submission to Welsh Assembly Committee 2002
[20] SRA Press release, January 1002, HISTORIC PRESS RELEASE : Eight Pre-Qualify for Wales & Borders Franchise [January 2002] – UKPOL.CO.UK
[21] Welsh Affairs Select Committee The Provision of Rail Services in Wales, HC 458 0304.PDF (parliament.uk)
[22] House of Commons Welsh Affairs Selected Committee, 2017 Wales and Borders rail franchise
[23] CCC Rapid Transit for Cardiff, TRL in association with AEA Technology Rail, Oct 2004 “Scoping, Feasibility, Engineering and Economic Study”
[24] Office of Road and Rail (ORR), Home page | Office of Rail and Road (orr.gov.uk)
[25] Welsh Government. 2020 “Historical investment in rail infrastructure enhancements [HTML] | GOV.WALES
[26] UK Government 1968, Transport Act 1968 (legislation.gov.uk)
[27] House of Commons Library, Buses: deregulation in the 1980s – House of Commons Library (parliament.uk)
[28] UTG Podcast, Tracy Brabin & UTG (Juergen Maier) Devolution has enabled me to make a difference
West Yorkshire Combined Authority, 2024, Mass Transit Hub | Your Voice (westyorks-ca.gov.uk)
[29] Taylor and Sloman (Transport for Quality of Life), Foundation for Integrated Transport 2016 160120_Building_a_world-class_bus_system_for_Britain_FINAL1 (transportforqualityoflife.com)
[30] Welsh Government, Active Travel (Wales) Act 2013, Active Travel (Wales) Act 2013 (legislation.gov.uk)
[31] Welsh Government, Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 – The Future Generations Commissioner for Wales
[32] Welsh Government, M4 Relief Road decision June 2019, Written Statement: M4 Decision (4 June 2019)
[33] Welsh Government, 2022, Wales Transport Strategy, “Llwybr Newydd” Llwybr Newydd: the Wales transport strategy 2021 | GOV.WALES
[34] Welsh Government, 2023, Response to the Roads Review Roads Review: Welsh Government response
[35] John Davies & Rhodri Clark, Platform 5, 1996, “Valley Lines – The People’s Railway – The Inside Story of a Train Business 1983-1993”
[36] SEWTA submission to Senedd Committee re Future Rail Infrastructure 2009, EL(3)-25-09 : Paper 6 : Future railway infrastructure in Wales – SEWTA (senedd.wales)
[37] Prof Stuart Cole & Wales Transport Research Centre, University of Glamorgan, 2009, “Rail Infrastructure in Wales, Challenges of the next 25 Years”
[38] Prof Stuart Cole, Wales Transport Research Centre University of Glamorgan, Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2002 “Capitals United”
[39] TfW Fflecsi, fflecsi | TfW
[40] Prof Stuart Cole, submission to Enterprise and Learning Committee, 2011, EL(3)-02-11 Paper 1 Welsh Assembly Governments new rail programme – Wales Transport Strategy Group (PDF, 140 KB).pdf (senedd.wales)
Prof Stuart Cole, submission to Senedd Enterprise and Business Committee Nov 2012, Consultation Response IPT31. Professor Stuart Cole University of Glamorgan.pdf (senedd.wales)
[41] National Assembly for Wales, Enterprise and Learning Committee, 2010, “Future Rail Infrastructure in Wales”
[42] UK Government, 2005, Railways Act 2005 (legislation.gov.uk)
[43] Welsh Government, 2020, Historical investment in rail infrastructure enhancements [HTML] | GOV.WALES. Note: these figures can vary depending on which time period one uses, which geography for Wales one uses ( eg the country or the NR route), the Barnett comparability factor, etc. However, no matter which assumptions one uses, at the large macro scale, all the calculations illustrate £Bns of relative underinvestment in the Wales rail network vs the UK average.
[44] Welsh Government Task and Finish Group, 2007, “HE Commercialisation_in_Wales” Gibson Review.pdf
[45] Professor Simon Gibson CBE is Chief Executive of Wesley Clover Corporation, Chair of the Alacrity Foundation.
[46] One North East was one of a number of reginal development agencies set up across England by the 1997-2010 UK Labour Government and dissolved by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition UK Government following the 2010 General Election.
[47] Tim Williams, from Wales, and has worked in Manchester, London and Sydney advising Governments and developers on cities, transport and regeneration Tim Williams | LinkedIn